On the eve of the very competitive Texas primaries, the Wizard has found himself watching the developing drama over the proposed downtown soccer stadium and would be land purchases from former council member and obviously still city hall insider Louis Macey. The hard words of long time City of Houston civil servant Ubu Roi in that posted thread have added to the concerns I have heard from political newcomers whom I have been active with on working on various municipal issues. Some people who suddenly find themselves in the political arena, often not because of their own doing, end up wondering whether Houston's form of government invests too much power in the hands of the mayor.
To put some perspective on this issue, the Wizard consulted his library and specifically, Richard Murray's Change and Governance in Houston for some answers as to what Houston had in terms of its governing structure before. Houston was granted its initial charter in 1905. As Murray recounts, Houston's first form of government was a commission style government composed of a mayor and four aldermen. City administration was parceled out between the aldermen, for example one alderman might be responsible for taxes and land while another was responsible for water. The mayor had veto powers, limited appointment powers, and budget preparation authority. Needless to say, this balkanized city administration, made aldermen turf lords over their part of city administration, turned the mayor's veto power into a reactive tool rather than an agenda building tool, and in general led to a fragmented and patronage laden form of government.
Various reforms were implemented formally during the 1930's, but they often weren't exercised for various reasons. Houston then went through a city manager form of government starting in 1938, which lasted until 1947 when the start of the strong mayor form of government was implemented. As Murray notes, the civic and business elite of the late 1940's wanted a form of government which reflected - but did not direct - growth and development. And they got what they wanted.
But what about today? Ubu Roi's post to the BlogHouston thread largely spells out the problems anyone council member has had to face in trying to challenge a sitting mayor over the past 60 years. I would add that if a sitting mayor did not (or does not) particularly want to deal with public complaints, then the mayor can appoint council members to a committee where CM's can put up with the complaining from citizens, but then see a mayor simply shelve anything that committee does by not acting on it or putting it on the formal agenda. I would argue that one of the groups I am working with right now faces this very problem.
Additionally, in order for council to stand up to a sitting mayor, 10 votes have to be mustered in any issue. Considering the mayor's power to set the agenda, as well as dole out goodies to council members, that is an awfully steep mountain to climb for anyone trying to fight back against the city. True, citizens can try to use the rather archaic initiative and referendum power to place charter amendments up for a vote at the hustings, but as we have seen with the Revcap and the "rain tax", the council can either confuse the issue by offering up a counter amendment out of its own granted power, can refuse to implement the charter change, revisit the issue and possibly subvert the intent of the charter change, or simply contest in court for years on end as it has with the Revcap.
One somewhat bright aspect of Houston's government, as was noted in the BlogHouston post, is the role played by Houston's elected city controller. Steven Craig noted in an academically published paper that Houston has succeeded throughout its history in avoiding bankruptcy, something that the somewhat similarly sized Philadelphia nearly succumbed to in 1991, but which still faces what the Pew Trusts calls a quiet crisis.
Craig believes that the primary difference between Houston's avoiding financial catastrophies (even during the oil busts of the 1980's) and Philadelphia's not doing so lies in that Houston had an independently elected controller. Houston's controller has to certify that monies are in the budget this year, whereas Philadelphia's controller had (through the 1980's and early 1990's at least) to certify that there were monies available for the previous year's budget and was an appointed figure to boot. Hence Craig contended that this led to a creeping increase of debt which eventually to a near municipal collapse.
But what about Houston's mayor? Another clue as to the mayor's power is to examine how much money people are willing to raise or spend in order to acquire the job. Hotly contested mayoral elections result in candidates raising and spending several million dollars apiece, while city council district posts often are won with campaigns where winners raise between $30,000 - $200,000. At large seats often take over $100,000 to win, but Peter Brown's spending of some $500,000 of his family fortune twice to gain at at large seat is something of an anomaly. The vast differences in amounts spent to gain offices gives away a huge signal in Houston's political markets as to where the real power lies in Houston city government.
So, what to do, if anything? There is no doubt that Houston's government has some real strengths. Decisions certainly can get made and implemented, unlike the chaos and corruption which has seemingly gripped Dallas. I do think that the 5 at large members certainly help with making sure that there are members of council whose jobs are to address issues of substance to the entire city, rather than merely to a district constituency. The problem we run into over time is when there are murky or contested issues, such as the soccer stadium, annexations, flood and drainage, or any rail plans that Metro throws out there. Is there a true consensus on contested issues? For example, recently the Chronicle ran a story where Metro and the congressional delegation told the FTA that there was an overwhelming consensus for rail plans, but that ignores the fact that the 2003 Metro Solutions ballot plan passed by a 52-48 margin.
It also doesn't help that a particular district council member cannot really set any kind of agenda at all for his or her own district without acquiescing to the mayor. In effect, this reduces council members to becoming mere advocates for their areas.
Therefore, I would suggest the following:
1) As I wrote before, extend term limits to 10-12 years in order to reinvigorate political competition.
2) Give council members something to bargain with! I would suggest that each council member be granted the power to place one item on the city agenda perhaps every week, every other week, or maybe once per month. Of course, a spending limit would be placed on what each council member can put on their agenda items. Perhaps council members could, in return for abstaining from putting items continuously on the agenda, be permitted to "save up" for one or two big items over time if they were something of importance for their district or their own agenda. The mayor would continue to have the power to set the rest of the agenda. This would encourage some log rolling and horse trading.
3) Give council members some say over municipal boards and administrative oversight. Leave the mayor with administrative powers over departments so that one person oversees city administration. The mayor would continue to appoint council members to committees, but in return council would have the power to compel the surrender by administrative department heads of full and complete information on committee items. As a modest and simple check, I would suggest that council either be granted the power of having to approve the mayor's board appointees by simple majority. Removal of board members or administrative department heads could be done, but it would take a substantial supermajority (perhaps a minimum of 75 percent) to accomplish.
Alternately, council members could be granted the power to appoint a minority of board members with the mayor holding the majority. District council members who happen to have a board exclusively in their own area would naturally have more to say over that board.
4) The city council is set by charter to expand by two seats once the city's population reaches 2.1 million. These two seats are set to both be district council seats. Why not make one an at large seat and keep the other as a district seat to strengthen the overall legislative agenda so that it does not get balkanized?
5) Keep the budget approval process as it is today. Keep the city controller's role as it is today.
I would think that these reforms would allow broad agendas to continue to be advanced, while allowing council members to take a stand against a mayor if a particular agenda item is really going to hammer their constituents or if something really seems murky. It would also pave the way for a truer kind of consensus of government in our fair city.
Wizard
Posted by The Mighty Wizard at March 4, 2008 01:05 AM